PLEA BARGAINING AND VICTIMS: FROM
CONSULTATION TO GUIDELINES
MICHAEL M. O'HEAR*

Though long expected by legal professionals to play the role of
"good Victorian children" (i.e., "seen but not heard"),' victims are
increasingly demanding, and receiving, a more active role in the
processing of criminal cases. Change has been most apparent at the
sentencing phase, where victim impact statements have become
commonplace.2
However, as many victims and their advocates
recognize, the actual sentence imposed is often effectively preordained,
or at least substantially shaped, by the terms of a plea agreement.3 As a
result, the victims' rights movement has also shown a keen interest in
creating a meaningful role for victims in the plea bargaining process.4
How best to structure the victim's role remains a matter of debate.
One possibility, advocated, for instance, by Professor George Fletcher,
would be to give the victim a veto over any proposed plea agreement.5
This proposal, however, has been subject to considerable criticism for its
subordination of public to private interests in the resolution of criminal
cases, as well as for various practical difficulties in its implementation.6
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1. I borrow the observation from Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Central District of
Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in FederalCapital Trials, 19 FED.
SENT'G REP. 5, 9 (2006) (discussing common use of victim statements in federal capital trials).
3. Michael M. O'Hear, Victims and CriminalJustice: What's Next?, 19 FED. SENT'G REP.
83, 86 (2006); see also Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal
Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 808 (2006) (detailing practical importance of plea
bargaining in federal sentencing guidelines system) [hereinafter O'Hear, Intent].
4. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 835, 868-69 (proposing amendment to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require
prosecutor to consult with victim regarding plea bargaining).
5. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL

TRIALS 248 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596,
1606-07 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us, 105
YALE L.J. 825, 847-48 (1995).
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Another, far more modest approach, advocated, for instance, by
Professor Sarah Welling, would be to grant the victim an opportunity to
express his or her views on any proposed plea agreement at the change
of plea hearing.7 However, by this point in the criminal process, the plea
agreement has already gained considerable momentum, and even when
the victim raises significant concerns, the judge may be quite reluctant to
reject the agreement, which would require everyone to expend more
effort on a case that otherwise appeared ripe for prompt resolution.
Yet another proposal-and the one of principal interest for present
purposes-would address the latter concern by requiring prosecutors to
consult with victims before entering into a plea agreement. Such a
requirement, which has already been made the law in at least twentytwo states,8 offers an opportunity for more meaningful victim
participation than would be available through a right to speak at the
plea hearing alone. However, the consultation requirement has been
resisted in other jurisdictions as costly and ineffective in practice.9
Moreover, even where the requirement does exist on paper, it is not
clear that prosecutors adhere to it in a rigorous, meaningful fashion."
Difficulties surrounding the consultation requirement highlight
fundamental problems, not with victims' rights, but with the broad scope
of discretion enjoyed by American prosecutors. Victim participation is
readily assimilated at sentencing because sentencing is a discrete, public
proceeding in which a public official (the judge) makes a decision that is
based on predetermined criteria and typically justified with some
specificity. Victim participation is not so readily incorporated into plea
negotiations because such negotiations are private, ad hoc interactions
in which the relevant public official (the prosecutor) makes decisions
without public explanation based on criteria that are often
unarticulated. Such a practice is not conducive to participation that
victims perceive to be effective and prosecutors perceive to be efficient.
In order to provide a framework for more meaningful plea
7. Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participationin Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 304
(1987). About one-third of states expressly permit victims to be heard at plea proceedings.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, VICTIM INPUT INTO PLEA

AGREEMENTS 2 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/welcome.html
[hereinafter OVC].
8. OVC, supra note 7, at 2.
9. See, e.g., Allen Edgar, Commentary, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 505,
507-10 (2004) (opposing adoption of consultation requirement in Canada).
10. See OVC, supra note 7, at 2 ("Because most states provide no consequences for noncompliance with [consultation] laws, however, crime victims are still frequently left out of the
plea agreement process.").
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bargaining consultation, victims' rights advocates should make common
cause with those who seek greater transparency and accountability in
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. To some, this might seem an
unexpected alliance, for the victims' rights movement has long enjoyed a
close and mutually beneficial relationship with law enforcement
professionals"-professionals who will assuredly not welcome fresh
constraints on their discretion. But the simple facts are that the
American criminal justice system is dominated by plea bargaining, and
plea bargaining is dominated by prosecutors.' 2 It is hard to see how the
goal of creating a robust role for victims in this system can be achieved
without some cost to the actor whose power now predominates-the
prosecutor. Followed to its end, the logic of victims' rights must
necessarily lead to some level of conflict with prosecutorial preferences.
To move from the abstract to the concrete, I will argue in this Article
for the adoption of prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining
guidelines as a victims' rights measure. Although prosecutorial
guidelines are not a new idea, 3 their proponents have not fully
appreciated the ability of such guidelines to advance the interests of
victims in fair, respectful treatment. The case for guidelines has been
made on several other grounds," which need not be detailed here at
length. My present purpose is not to provide a comprehensive argument
for prosecutorial guidelines (or, for that matter, to respond
comprehensively to objections), but rather to complement the work
done elsewhere with an additional perspective that may make what I
believe to be an already strong case even more compelling.
Part I explains why we should care about victims' views of the

11. Erin Ann O'Hara, Victim Participationin the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 229,
242-43 (2005).
12. O'Hear, Intent, supra note 3, at 808.
13. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law
with Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 381 (1979) (noting "need to establish some form of
guideline system for prosecutors" in addition to judges).
14. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1971); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and
Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Ellen S. Podgor, Department of
Justice Guidelines: Balancing "DiscretionaryJustice," 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167,
194 (2004); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 778
(1980); Ronald F. Wright, ProsecutorialGuidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 1087, 1104-05 (2005). In addition to guidelines, others have also argued for
other methods of constraining prosecutorial discretion, such as a requirement that refusals to

charge be accompanied by a statement of reasons. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 205-07 (1969). My proposal here, as sketched below in

Part III.A, also involves an explanation requirement.
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criminal justice system, and in particular, whether they perceive the
system to be procedurally just. Part II elaborates on the potential
contributions of a consultation requirement to procedural justice, as well
as the reasons that such a requirement, standing alone, may fall short of
expectations. Part III proposes the use of advisory prosecutorial
guidelines as a means to strengthen the consultation requirement and
otherwise enhance perceived procedural justice. Part IV addresses a
variety of potential objections to my proposal.
I. THE CASE FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS

Although victims are not formally parties in criminal litigation, many
perceive themselves to have unique and compelling interests in "their"
cases, interests that warrant some particular consideration of their views
in resolving the cases.
This desire for meaningful participation
appropriately triggers concerns over the traditional practice of excluding
victims from the plea negotiation process. At the same time, as in any
discussion of an enhanced role for victims in criminal procedure, we
must be wary of the danger that criminal justice will be degraded into a
system of private vengeance. Yet, attentiveness to victim interests in
plea bargaining does not necessarily imply full-blown privatization.
Indeed, as this Part will show, in seeking to provide greater procedural
justice for victims, we may simultaneously advance several important
public interests. These public interests encompass both utilitarian
considerations (such as crime control) and the reaffirmation of victim
dignity in ways that resonate with more retributive ways of thinking.
In making these claims, I rely to a great extent on a well-established
body of social psychology research on procedural justice. The principal
findings of this research, which I have discussed in greater detail
elsewhere,15 may be characterized as follows.
First, a person's
perception of the fairness of an official decision (here, the prosecutor's
decision to make or accept a particular plea offer) does not depend
solely on the outcome, but also on various attributes of the process used
to reach the outcome. 16 Those attributes include (1) whether the people
involved had an opportunity to tell their side of the story ("voice"); (2)
whether the authorities were seen as unbiased, honest, and principled

15. O'Hear, supra note 14.
16. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HuO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 196 (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural

Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, in 30 CRIME & JUSTICE 283,286 (Michael
Tonry ed., 2003).
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("neutrality"); (3) "whether the authorities involved [were] seen as
benevolent and caring" ("trustworthiness"); and (4) "whether the
people involved [were] treated with dignity and respect.""
The
perception of voice, neutrality, trustworthiness, and respect can promote
people's acceptance of decisions that they believe to be incorrect or
substantively unfair.'8
Indeed, in many settings, perceptions of
procedural fairness exert greater influence over acceptance than do the
outcomes themselves.' 9 Second, the extent to which decision-making
processes are perceived as fair helps shape beliefs regarding the
legitimacy of the legal authorities responsible for the decision.0 And
third, the perception that legal authorities have legitimacy enhances the
sense that the "authorities are entitled to be obeyed."'" Fair procedures
thus promote cooperation with the authorities and compliance with
their directives, as well as the development of a more general sense of
obligation to obey the law.22
The social psychology research thus suggests several public benefits
that may result from treating victims with procedural justice during plea
negotiations. Procedural justice likely enhances the acceptance of
bargained outcomes, potentially diminishing the tendency of some
victims to seek vengeance outside the criminal justice system.
Procedural justice also fosters cooperative attitudes towards the
authorities and promotes general law-abidingness. These benefits,
moreover, may be more significant than might first appear. Despite the
common stereotype of blameless victims and random victimization,
many victims are themselves involved in criminal activity, live in
neighborhoods with high crime rates, or are otherwise at high risk for
involvement in or exposure to additional offenses.2 3 As to such victims
in particular, there may be important law enforcement benefits that

17. Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation
for Harm: Examining the September l1th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.

355,380 (2003).
18. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice, in HANDBOOK OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000)
(discussing procedural fairness in broad terms).
19. Id. at 71.
20. Tyler, supra note 16, at 286.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 297.
23. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 155 (2002) ("Offenders and victims, as groups, tend to share
important socioeconomic characteristics. They are disproportionately young, poor, and
black.").
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result from perceptions that legal authorities are worthy of respect and
cooperation. (One need only think of the "anti-snitching" movement
found in many minority communities to appreciate the consequences of
a breakdown in respect for the authorities.)
Like ripples on a pond, perceptions of fair treatment and acceptance
of outcomes may also spread from victims to a broader public. This may
occur by word of mouth, or, in more high-profile cases, through media
coverage. The public generally distrusts and dislikes plea bargaining,24
which creates important legitimacy problems for a criminal justice
system dominated by the practice. For this reason, as many leading
commentators have argued, action should be taken to improve public
perceptions of plea bargaining and thereby enhance public confidence in
the system. 25 The challenge in doing so, however, is that the public has
little direct knowledge of how plea bargaining actually works and little
reason to trust the self-serving reassurances of insiders that the system
Victims' denunciations of plea agreements,
really does justice.
especially when publicized in high-profile cases, cannot help matters.
Conversely, when a victim feels well-treated by the system and makes
such views known to the press, members of the public may feel that they
have a more reliable basis for concluding that the plea agreement at
issue really did resolve the case appropriately.
Moving beyond the legitimacy concerns of the social psychology
paradigm, there may be additional public benefits flowing from
procedural justice. Victim voice plays a crucial role in the procedural
justice model, and voice opportunities may convey important
information to prosecutors before a plea deal is agreed to and acquires
what may be unstoppable momentum. The information may bear on a
defendant's guilt, e.g., if a victim impact statement contains information
that is incidentally exculpatory as to the person being prosecuted for the
crime. A growing body of scholarly literature has identified wrongful
convictions as a significant problem in the American plea bargaining
system; 26 some such convictions may be prevented by providing
prosecutors with additional information beyond what is contained in the
police reports that are typically relied on in formulating plea offers.27
24. See Sergio Herzog, Plea BargainingPractices:Less Covert, More Public Support?, 50
CRIME & DELINQ. 590, 590-91 (2004) (discussing research on public attitudes towards plea
bargaining).
25. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79,109-10 (2005).
26. See, e.g., id. at 81.
27. See, e.g., Plea Bargainingfrom the Criminal Lawyer's Perspective:Plea Bargainingin

2007]

PLEA BARGAINING AND VICTIMS

Moreover, beyond enhancing the accuracy of guilt determination,
additional information may also help prosecutors make better decisions
as to sentences. While prosecutors do not formally select the sentence
to be imposed after acceptance of the guilty plea, the plea agreement
will typically shape the sentence in important ways, such as by calling for
the dismissal of particular charges and thereby decreasing the applicable
maximum or minimum sentence, or by obligating the prosecutor to
recommend a particular sentence or sentencing range. In light of the
power that the prosecutor can exercise over the sentence, the public has
an important interest in ensuring that the prosecutor has enough
information during plea negotiations to determine an appropriate
outcome for the case. Potentially useful information from victims may
pertain both to the severity and to the type of sentence imposed. A
victim's information regarding the defendant's conduct and the resulting
harm will help the prosecutor to ensure that the sentence is
proportionate to the crime. A victim's information may also help the
prosecutor to better appreciate the need (or lack thereof) for "a
restitutionary component to the sentence, the need (or lack thereof) for
an incarcerative component to prevent revictimization, and the
psychological value to the victim of a full, public acceptance of
responsibility by the offender.
Procedural justice for victims can thus advance several wellrecognized public ends of the criminal justice system, including effective
crime control, accurate guilt determination, and proportionate
punishment. At the same time, we should not forget that while public
ends are indeed paramount in criminal justice, those public ends also
encompass some measure of solicitude for victim well-being per se. The
availability of restitution for victims in many criminal cases provides an
obvious illustration. At a deeper level, a basic concern for victims
arguably animates the practice of retribution, which is unquestionably a
core-perhaps the core-purpose of criminal punishment.
More
specifically, as Jean Hampton has asserted in her highly influential
theory of punishment, "[Rietribution is actually a form of compensation
to the victim. ' 29 This claim follows from Hampton's observation that the
Wisconsin, 91 MARO. L. REV. 357, 361 (2007) (remarks of former Milwaukee County District
Attorney E. Michael McCann, describing reliance on police reports that are sometimes biased
or inaccurate).
28. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 846-47 (2002) (discussing widespread recognition of
retributivism as a dominant theory of punishment).
29. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,
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sorts of wrongs that merit retribution are those that implicitly express a
denigration of the victim's essential value as a person. 30 The point of the
retributive response, then, is to express a contrary message:
[R]etribution is a response to a wrong that is intended to
vindicate the value of the victim denied by the
wrongdoer's action through the construction of an event
that not only repudiates the action's message of
superiority over the victim but does so in a wayj that
confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.
Viewing the criminal justice system as retributive in this victimaffirming sense resonates nicely with the common intuition (now
reflected in so much victims' rights legislation) that victims have a
legitimate stake in the sentencing process, and that victims are
appropriately aggrieved when a sentence seems disproportionately light
relative to the offense.
If the public ends of criminal law really do include vindicating the
value of the victim, then providing procedural justice to victims would
advance that end in important ways. As the social psychologists have
recognized, one reason that we care so much about fair procedures is
that they communicate positive messages as to social standing.32
Alternatively, if one prefers, like Hampton herself, to draw on the
Kantian tradition of moral reasoning, then procedural justice is still
readily linked to the recognition of individual worth.33 The connection is
central, for instance, to Jerry Mashaw's influential "dignitary" theory of
process.34 Mashaw notes that voice contributes to individual feelings of
self-respect,35 while a lack of voice implies a loss of control and may be

39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992).

30. Id. at 1686.
31. Id. See also DUBBER, supra note 23, at 154 ("[T]he point of the entire criminal
law ... is to vindicate the victim's right to autonomy.").
32. Tyler & Lind, supra note 18, at 76 ("When one is treated politely and with dignity
and when respect is shown for one's rights and opinions, feelings of positive standing are
enhanced. On the other hand, undignified, disrespectful, or impolite treatment by an
authority carries the implications that one is not a full member of the group.") (citation
omitted).
33. Hampton, supra note 29, at 1667-68.
34. For the most detailed elaboration of Mashaw's theory, see generally JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985).

35. Id. at 200.
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seen as a denial of self-worth.36 Moreover, in addition to voice, Mashaw
also highlights the dignitary significance of notice and explanation in
connection with government decisions:
[Incomprehensible processes] take away the participants'
ability to engage in rational planning about their
situation, to make informed choices among options. The
process implicitly defines the participants as objects,
subject to infinite manipulation by the system. To avoid
contributing to this sense of alienation, terror, and
ultimately self-hatred, a decisional process must give
participants adequate notice of the issues to be decided,
of the evidence that is relevant to those issues, and of
how the decisional process itself works. In the end, there
also must be some guarantee, usually by articulation of
the basis for the decision, that the issues, evidence, and
processes were meaningful to the outcome. This reason
giving is necessary, both to redeem prior promises of
rationality, and to provide guidance for the individual's
future planning. In this latter aspect, reason giving
confirms the participant, even in the face of substantive
ongoing process of
disappointment, as engaging in 3an
7
rational and self-regarding action.
The case for procedural justice for victims, then, arises from both a
concern for utilitarian ends, including crime control, and also a desire to
complement the dignity-affirming agenda of retributive punishment.38
To be sure, procedural justice also comes with various costs, perhaps
most notably in the form of additional administrative burdens for
prosecutors-a matter of particular concern in the present context, for
plea bargaining is usually justified as a necessary expedient for
overburdened criminal justice officials. The costs, however, are better
assessed after we have in mind a more specific proposal for
implementing procedural justice, the development of which is my

36. Id. at 178.
37. Id. at 175-76.
38. This is not to claim, however, that victim participation in plea bargaining necessarily
contributes to the resolution of victims' psychological trauma, which may actually be
heightened by engagement with criminal justice processes. Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third
Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 296
n.35. As Professor Beloof has argued, however, the potential risks to some victims do not
constitute a persuasive reason to withhold from all victims the option of participating. Id.
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project in the next two Parts.
II. THE CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT: POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS

At first blush, mandatory consultation would seem a clearly useful
way to enhance perceived procedural justice. Requiring a prosecutor to
obtain the victim's views before consummating a plea deal guarantees
the victim some measure of voice in the process-voice that may be
considerably more meaningful than an opportunity to speak at the plea
hearing or at sentencing, by which time, in many cases, the most
important decisions have already been made.
Yet, mandatory consultation has also been subject to a variety of
important criticisms, which essentially reflect two distinct concerns.
First, consultation diverts scarce criminal justice resources that could be
better spent elsewhere.39 There is, of course, the time spent directly
soliciting and receiving victim input, which, depending on the
circumstances and individuals involved, may or may not be a lengthy
process. Even when the exchange is brief, however, it may represent a
significant burden in routine, high-volume cases, in which many
prosecutors are accustomed to plea "negotiations" that last no more
than a few minutes. Perhaps even more important, though, are the
ancillary logistical difficulties. Many victims will be hard to track down,
slow to respond to letters and phone messages, or unable to visit the
courthouse or prosecutor's office during regular working hours.
Consulting with such victims may not only require considerable effort
on the part of the prosecutor, but also may entail repeated continuances
and fruitless court appearances. Such delays are not only costly to the
lawyers and court personnel, but they may also represent a great
unfairness to a defendant waiting in pretrial detention for resolution of a
routine, low-level case. Indeed, in some cases, the victim himself or
herself may actually wish more for prompt resolution than for an
opportunity to weigh in on the proposed plea deal.
Such concerns may be alleviated by adopting some sort of
"reasonable efforts" proviso that effectively excuses the prosecutor from
consulting with victims who present logistical challenges. But, this
response may undermine the practical value of the consultation
requirement; the victims who respond promptly to messages and get
themselves to prosecutors' offices on a timely basis will probably do a
pretty good job of making their voices heard with or without mandatory

39. See, e.g., Edgar, supra note 9, at 508-09.
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consultation.
Alternatively, a prosecutorial office may lessen the administrative
burdens by hiring a victim coordinator to handle the logistics and
perhaps even the consultation itself.
However, a capable
paraprofessional staff will not come without its own costs. Moreover,
there may be significant risks of error or misunderstanding when victimprosecutor communications go through an intermediary.
A second broad area of concern is that of disappointed expectations.
As one critic, Allen Edgar, has put it:
Many victims already think the prosecutor is supposed to
represent them and expect their impact statement to
affect the outcome of sentencing.
When these
expectations go unfulfilled, as they usually do, victim
dissatisfaction increases, not just with the sentencing
process but with the criminal justice system as a whole.
Compulsory consultation can only increase the likelihood
that victims will think of the prosecutor as representing
them, while participation . . . will generate greater
expectations-and subsequent increased dissatisfaction
when they remain largely unfulfilled.4"
From the standpoint of procedural justice theory, this critique is an
especially striking one: a voice opportunity intended to increase victim
satisfaction and acceptance of outcomes may actually end up doing
precisely the opposite.
Edgar's concerns may be alleviated to the extent that prosecutors
take particular care to ensure that victims have an accurate
understanding of the prosecutorial role and the limits of the consultation
requirement-but not without thereby exacerbating the transaction
costs problem. Indeed, some might see something of a Catch-22 here:
the only way to ensure real improvements in victim satisfaction through
consultation may be to insist on such intensive efforts by prosecutors as
to defeat the whole efficiency-enhancing point of plea bargaining.
III. PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

The use of prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining guidelines
may function as an effective complement to mandatory consultation,
both by addressing the major objections to consultation and by making
40. Id. at 507 (citation omitted).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:323

an important, independent contribution to procedural justice. Before
explaining these benefits, however, I will offer a more detailed
description of how the guidelines might be crafted and fit into the plea
bargaining process.
A. Creatingand Using ProsecutorialGuidelines

In considering how best to structure prosecutorial guidelines, we
may benefit from more than two decades of experience in this country
with sentencing guidelines. Like prosecutorial guidelines, sentencing
guidelines are intended to identify and assign weights to many of the key
variables that properly dominate a traditionally discretionary decisionmaking process (here, the judge's selection of a sentence). In the
sentencing context, different jurisdictions have experimented with a
variety of different ways of structuring and using guidelines, some of
which have been considerably more successful than others. Salient
lessons include the following:
*

Guidelines should be simple, focusing the decision maker
on a small number of variables that really do and should
control the outcome in most cases. 41

*

Guidelines should be designed for ordinary cases, leaving
the decision maker with discretion to depart from the
guidelines for cases determined to be unusual in some
significant respect.42

*

Guidelines need not be formally "mandatory" or
externally enforceable in order to make a difference;
while front-line decision makers will pay attention even to
purely advisory guidelines that show genuine respect for
the experience and practical wisdom of those in the
trenches, such decision makers can and will circumvent
mandatory guidelines they perceive to be illegitimate or

41. See, e.g., R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines:Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
739, 756 (2001); Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1,
16-20 (2005).
42. See, e.g., The Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations for
Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 310, 316-17
(2006).
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substantively misguided.43
These lessons dovetail nicely with the field studies of plea
bargaining, underscoring the suitability of plea bargaining for guidelines
treatment. Field studies demonstrate the existence of well-established
"going rates" for different categories of offense and offender." Thus,
experienced lawyers are already accustomed to sorting out cases based
on a limited number of variables; this is what permits them to reach
agreement on plea terms so swiftly in so many cases. 5 The research also
indicates that experienced lawyers already think in terms of ordinary
46
and unusual cases and are well attuned to what differentiates the two.
All of this suggests that prosecutors should not find it especially
onerous to produce reasonably straightforward, usable guidelines based
on what they already do, guidelines that would simply identify the
standard plea deal for commonly recurring case types. For instance, one
might imagine a guideline for muggings that looks like this:

Standard Charge

Offense/Offender
Characteristics

Simple theft

None of the aggravating
characteristics associated
with the more serious
standard charges

Theft from person

Any one of the following:
has
prior
defendant
conviction for felony or

43. See, e.g., Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely
Era, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 233, 235-39 (2005); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention
and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1289-90 (1997)
(discussing widespread circumvention of federal sentencing guidelines).
44. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 187-88 (paperback ed. 1992); CANDACE MCCOY,
POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 131 (1993).
45. See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 44, at 187-88; MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
35 (paperback ed. 1981).
46. See MCCOY, supra note 44, at 60-61.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:323

offense;
other
violent
defendant
was armed;
victim was elderly or
especially
otherwise
vulnerable
Robbery

Any
two
of
the
characteristics associated
with "theft from person"
(including
two
prior
convictions for a felony or
other violent offense); or
Any one of the following:
victim suffered a physical
injury as a result of the
offense;
or
defendant
brandished or otherwise
visibly carried a deadly
weapon

Armed robbery

Defendant was armed plus
any two characteristics
associated with "robbery"

In order for the State to agree to resolve a case without
trial, the defendant must normally plead guilty to the
applicable standard charge. It is appropriate to depart
from the standard charge when the standard charge
significantly overstates or understates the severity of the
crime, particularly when the applicable offense and
offender characteristics do not accurately or fully reflect
the harm done, the dangerousness of the offense, or the
need to prevent further crimes by the offender.
Of course, the recommended list of offense and offender
characteristics does not come close to exhausting the potentially
relevant characteristics. Other characteristics, however, may be taken
into account at sentencing by the judge, or, in unusual cases, used as the
basis for a nonstandard charge ("departure"). In other words, a set of
prosecutorial guidelines designed to identify a standard offense of
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conviction to be sought in ordinary cases simply need not deal with the
full range of real-world complexity. The guidelines may, however,
require a somewhat lengthier set of variables in jurisdictions in which
plea agreements routinely cover not only an offense of conviction, but
also sentencing recommendations or stipulations. At the same time, it is
important even in such jurisdictions not to forget the virtues of
simplicity in guidelines drafting.47
How might guidelines be incorporated into the plea bargaining
process in a manner that also respects the goal of victim voice? I would
envision something like the following. Shortly after a decision is made
to file charges in a case, the prosecutor contacts the victim. An initial
communication provides general background information about the
criminal justice system, includes copies of any potentially relevant
prosecutorial guidelines, and identifies the prosecutor's initial
assessment of what the applicable standard charge would be. The
communication further explains the sentencing consequences of a guilty
plea to the standard charge. Finally, the communication solicits the
victim's views on the appropriateness of the standard charge in his or
her case. The victim is invited to supply additional information that
might show the prosecutor's initial assessment of the case was incorrect
(for instance, where the police report fails to mention it, a mugging
victim might inform the prosecutor that the defendant did, in fact,
brandish a weapon), as well as information that might justify a
nonstandard resolution (for instance, if the defendant, although not
carrying a weapon, acted in an extremely threatening manner that
produced intense levels of fear comparable to an armed robbery).48
Victim responses are requested promptly, with multiple options
available for submissions: letter, email, Internet form, phone call, or inperson meeting. If the initial communication is by mail, it is followed up
with a phone call by the prosecutor or victim coordinator to ensure
receipt and answer questions.
At the same time, the defendant is asked for the same sort of input:
is the initial assessment of the appropriate plea either incorrect or
otherwise unjust? If either the victim or the defendant supplies
information that, in the prosecutor's view, justifies movement from the
47. See generally Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 41.
48. Prosecutors ought to provide a clear idea in advance of what information they might
deem relevant, not only so as to minimize the likelihood that their time and victims' time will
be wasted through the submission of much unhelpful material, but also so that any
subsequent rejection of victim information as irrelevant will less likely be viewed as
unexpected or arbitrary.
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initial assessment, then the other side is given an opportunity to respond
if such a response might be helpful. 49 The prosecutor may also solicit
additional information from police officers to help resolve discrepancies.
Once the prosecutor reaches a definitive view on the appropriate plea
deal, the defendant has an opportunity to accept or reject it. If there is
acceptance, then, with prior notice to the victim, the case is scheduled
for a plea hearing. At the hearing, the prosecutor briefly explains, by
reference to the guidelines, how he or she determined the appropriate
charge. If either the victim or the defendant sought a different
resolution, the prosecutor also briefly summarizes that person's position
and explains why it was not accepted. If the victim is aggrieved, then he
or she will have an opportunity to address the court and argue that the
plea deal should be rejected based on the traditional legal standards for
guilty plea acceptance.
Should the guidelines be enforceable? For instance, should a victim
have any recourse if the prosecutor made an obvious error in
determining the standard plea deal (e.g., by ignoring credible,
uncontroverted evidence that a robber brandished a gun)? Or if the
prosecutor abused his or her discretion in deciding to depart from the
standard deal (e.g., by reducing charges for no apparent reason)? In
theory, the victim might be given a right to "appeal" the prosecutor's
decision either to the judge or internally within the prosecutor's office to
supervisors. Without a right of appeal, of course, there is a risk that
guidelines will be ignored, leaving us back in Allen Edgar's world of
disappointed victim expectations. °
On the other hand, the creation of formal enforcement mechanisms
may substantially increase transaction costs, actually exacerbate the
problem of disappointed expectations, or both. In practice, the judiciary
has proven extremely reluctant to second-guess charging and plea
bargaining decisions," while formal internal complaint procedures have
also often proven ineffective and frustrating to outsiders. 5 Moreover,
49. This layer of process is perhaps appropriately dispensed with in routine, low-level

cases. Indeed, as a matter of fairness to defendants, it may be best to carve out an exception
to mandatory consultation for certain categories of cases that are likely to result in a sentence
of time served. In such cases, any time spent on fulfilling the consultation requirement might

effectively result in a substantial increase in sentence length for defendants who are unable to
secure pretrial release.
50. See Edgar, supra note 9, at 507.
51. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN

PROSECUTOR 14-15 (2007) (discussing relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence).
52. See id. at 157-60 (discussing complaints about the United States Department of
Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility).
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the experience with sentencing guidelines suggests that formal
enforcement may be unnecessary. 3 If front-line prosecutors have a
meaningful voice in the development of guidelines and do not perceive
guidelines to be a wholly top-down initiative, then they may take the
guidelines seriously even without a threat of formal "reversal" by a
judge or supervisor.
Additionally, various informal enforcement
mechanisms may also strengthen compliance. For instance, the victim's
opportunity to air grievances at the plea hearing may result in public
embarrassment for a prosecutor who abuses his discretion in applying
the guidelines. Moreover, the risk of complaints to the press and bad
publicity creates incentives for elected head prosecutors to monitor
compliance and address problems even in the absence of a formal
review mechanism.
B. Making Consultation Work
Guidelines may powerfully complement a consultation requirement,
including by diminishing some of the problems associated with a standalone requirement. Most importantly, guidelines address the problem
of disappointed expectations. If a victim sees that the prosecutor's
primary role is to apply general guidelines to specific cases, then the
victim should be able to better appreciate that the prosecutor is not his
or her lawyer, but rather a custodian of broader public interests.
Moreover, the very existence of plea-bargaining guidelines underscores
that plea bargaining is the normal method of resolving cases and makes
clear that plea bargaining occurs not against a blank slate in each case,
but instead in the shadow of a long course of precedent and prior
dealings between prosecutors and defense lawyers. Finally, guidelines
give the victim a good idea early in the case as to the likely content of
the plea deal, as well as to the sorts of considerations that might move
the prosecutor away from his or her initial assessment. All of this
should help minimize the likelihood that a victim will feel surprised
when a plea deal is presented to the court or betrayed when a
prosecutor decides to resolve a case in a way that is contrary to the
victim's preferences.
Guidelines may also lessen the transaction costs of consultation. To

53. See Hunt & Connelly, supra note 43, at 237 ("A system perceived as responsive and
legitimate by judges, reinforced by good communication from data agencies, might be more
immune to these problems [of circumvention] and actually more adaptable to agreed-upon
change. Advisory guidelines are at least as likely to satisfy these requirements in the eyes of
judges as presumptive guidelines.").
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be sure, guidelines do require some additional upfront transaction costs
as they are drafted and as prosecutors are trained in their use. Over the
long run, however, guidelines may facilitate efficient and timely
consultation. The guidelines will indicate a likely resolution and clarify
the matters that are of particular concern to the prosecutor, helping the
victim to tailor his or her comments in the most productive way. With
less need for back and forth communication, consultation may not
require the prosecutor and victim to meet in person or to speak live on
the telephone. Instead, victims may be able to provide their input quite
effectively through a single letter or voicemail message. Alternatively,
with less likelihood of a misunderstanding of the prosecutor's role and
likely outcome, guidelines may make it easier and more appropriate for
consultation to occur through a specialized victim coordinator.
C. Independent Benefits of Guidelines
In addition to shoring up the consultation requirement, guidelines
can also make important independent contributions to the sorts of goals
identified in Part L 4 For instance, consider the procedural justice effect:
if victims are treated in a way that is perceived to be procedurally just,
they are more likely to accept the outcomes in their cases, feel respect
for the authorities, and regard the law as something they ought to obey.
Although voice (embodied here by consultation) is an important
component of procedural justice, the social psychology literature also
identifies neutrality as another important characteristic.5 Neutrality is
associated with a decision maker who is unbiased, honest, and
principled.5 6 In particular, the social psychology research indicates that a
decision maker can help to establish his or her neutrality through the
use of objective criteria. 7 Thus, prosecutors may further procedural
justice ends by employing guidelines that are built around objective
offense and offender characteristics, as in my sample robbery guideline.
That way, even when a victim feels disappointed with the way his or her
case was resolved, the victim may nonetheless have confidence that the
outcome was nothing personal-the prosecutor was just adhering to
54. Indeed,

it is possible

that guidelines

alone,

without

a linked

consultation

requirement, would strike the optimal balance between the competing goals of maximizing
procedural justice and minimizing transaction costs. A transparent, objective decisionmaking process might ultimately be more valuable from the victim's perspective than an

opportunity for voice.
55. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 17, at 380.
56. Id.

57. Tyler, supra note 16, at 298.
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predetermined, general norms.
In addition to enhancing the procedural justice effect, guidelines
may also help prosecutors to reach better substantive outcomes. The
process of first developing guidelines and then considering on a case-bycase basis what warrants departure and how to justify decisions may
help prosecutors to be more self-conscious and deliberative about what
they do, which may contribute to more thoughtful and better-informed
decision making. Moreover, guidelines may also lead to greater
uniformity-that is, the consistent treatment of similar cases-which is
in itself an important component of substantive justice. 8 Victims and
other observers will perceive outcomes to be unfair if they diverge
markedly from expectations, and expectations are formed, in part, by
the outcomes of prior cases." The disparate treatment of similar cases
may thus undermine the criminal justice goals of reaffirming the basic
dignity of all victims and rejecting the implicit message of inequality
conveyed by criminal offenses. Guidelines may help to address this
problem by minimizing the number and extent of disparities.
Guidelines may also work to reaffirm victim dignity in the more
procedural sense suggested by Professor Mashaw's work. As noted
above, Mashaw emphasizes the importance of notice and explanation as
forms of due process that embody respect for the rationality and
autonomy of decision recipients. 6' Guidelines would facilitate this sort
of due process in the plea bargaining context, providing victims ex ante
with clear notice as to what factors are of greatest significance, while
providing prosecutors ex post with a convenient means of explaining
their decisions. To be sure, as Mashaw himself warns, an overly rigid
reliance on simple, objective guidelines may be as demeaning as a
system of broad, open-ended discretion.61 For that reason, it is
58. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., ProceduralJustice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 483,485-86 (1988).

59. See James H. McGinnis & Kenneth A. Carlson, Offenders' Perceptions of Their
Sentences, 5 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING SERVS. & REHABILITATION., Mar. 1982, at 27, 35
("These data [gathered in prison inmate interviews] indicate that offenders' perception of
their sentences as lenient or severe is a function of the deviation of the sentences from their
expectations."); Michael M. O'Hear, The End of Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of
Apprendi to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 866, 881 (2007) (discussing
importance of expectations in determining fairness).
60. MASHAW, supra note 34, at 175-76.

61. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 30 (2001) ("We are
confronted everywhere by rules that do not seem to fit our particular cases. Application of
the rules not only disappoints our expectations, it often seems to falsify our experience, and to
challenge our conceptions of ourselves as autonomous moral agents.").
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important to balance guidance and discretion. I have attempted to do
that in my proposal by recognizing the appropriateness of departures
from the guidelines in unusual cases. I would also, in the same vein,
preserve a significant (though not unlimited) degree of judicial
discretion at sentencing to provide an alternative opportunity for victims
to seek recognition of the unique dimensions of the harm they have
suffered. 62
Finally, although I emphasize the role of victims in this Article, it
should also be noted that (as I have argued elsewhere) guidelines may
contribute to helpful procedural justice effects among defendants, 63 as
well as enhance the transparency, and hence democratic accountability,
of the plea bargaining system to the general public. 64
IV.

RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS

Even assuming that we are in a jurisdiction that has already
committed itself to a role for victims in plea bargaining, as by adopting a
consultation requirement, there are still a number of important
objections that might be made to my additional proposal for the
complementary use of prosecutorial guidelines.
This Part briefly
considers three such objections: transaction costs will be excessive,
recalcitrant prosecutors will undermine the effectiveness of guidelines,
and guidelines will ratchet up the severity of an American criminal
justice system that is already too harsh by global standards.
A. Transaction Costs
Any attempt to establish a meaningful role for victims in plea
bargaining will impose additional transaction costs on the criminal
justice system. However, a jurisdiction with mandatory consultation has
already decided that, at some level, the trade-off is worthwhile. And if
there is a commitment to robust-as opposed to merely symbolicconsultation, then the overlay of guidelines may actually help to make
consultation more timely and efficient. 6 To be sure, such benefits must
be counterbalanced against the transaction costs of guidelines

62. Thus, the guidelines envisioned here are not intended to function in nearly so rigid
and crude a fashion as mandatory minimum sentencing laws. As Professor Beloof has
argued, mandatory minimums devalue the participatory rights of victims and offenders alike.
Beloof, supra note 38, at 302-03.
63. O'Hear, supra note 14.
64. Id.
65. Supra Part III.B.
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development, as well as the costs of training prosecutors in their use and
perhaps monitoring compliance and responding to problems.
Additionally, as I envision it, the guidelines might occasionally give rise
to a form of collateral quasi-litigation, as prosecutors try to sort out
competing claims from victims and defendants. (Imagine, for instance, a
robbery case in which the victim and defendant disagree as to whether a
gun was brandished during the crime.) Prosecutors will have to find
appropriate ways of balancing the desire for accuracy with the essential
nature of plea bargaining as a form of expedited case resolution. On the
other hand, with or without my proposal, prosecutors should be striving
for consistency and accuracy in their plea bargaining decisions; the
guidelines may focus and channel victim-defendant disputes, but they do
not fundamentally alter what the conscientious prosecutor should be
doing anyway by way of truth-seeking. In the end, while transaction
costs are a legitimate concern, they do not necessarily appear either
unmanageable or unwarranted.
B. ProsecutorialCooperation
As envisioned here, guidelines will subject the exercise of
discretion to greater transparency and public
prosecutorial
accountability. Yet, for reasons both good and bad, discretionary
decision makers often resist transparency and accountability. This
tendency presents a significant challenge for my proposal because
recalcitrant prosecutors may effectively undermine the guidelines
project at two levels. First, at the general level of guidelines drafting,
prosecutors may seek to build so much discretion into the guidelines
themselves that they lose much of their usefulness. For instance, a
robbery guideline might be drafted so as to require the maximum charge
in "unusually serious" cases-a subjective determination that would
leave prosecutors with considerable wiggle room in deciding whether to
pursue the maximum charge. Second, at the level of case-specific
application, individual prosecutors may disregard the guidelines or use
them in disingenuous ways, as by accepting poorly justified arguments
for departures.
The first problem may be addressed through external regulation of
the guidelines. For instance, an independent commission may be
charged with ensuring that guidelines are appropriately specific and
objective. On the other hand, dealing with the first problem in this way
may exacerbate the second problem, as prosecutors may take the
guidelines less seriously on a case-by-case basis to the extent they are
perceived as something that has been externally imposed.
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It would be preferable to secure genuine buy-in from prosecutors.
Some may be swayed by the potential for procedural justice in plea
bargaining to advance crime-control objectives. Although procedural
justice does not fit the standard "get-tough" paradigm of crime control
that is often found in law enforcement culture, thoughtful prosecutors
recognize the limitations of "get-tough," and many have embraced
promising, if softer, alternatives, such as restorative justice and problemsolving courts.66 Moreover, many prosecutors view themselves as having
a special obligation to victims, and there is now a long history of
collaboration between prosecutors and the victims' rights movement. 7
To the extent that guidelines are viewed as a victims' rights issue-as
they should be-then prosecutors will likely prove more open to their
adoption.
C. Harshness
The national experience with sentencing guidelines raises an
additional area of concern: the widespread adoption of sentencing
guidelines over the past three decades has coincided with an
unprecedented lengthening of prison terms and expansion of prison
populations.68 Making the sentencing process more transparent has
arguably contributed to its politicization, fueling the steady drumbeat of
election-year sentencing bills that ratchet prison terms ever upward.
Perhaps it is better to leave plea bargaining in a black box where
prosecutors have the freedom to exercise lenience on a case-by-case
basis without fear of political repercussions. By contrast, as they reduce
plea bargaining practices to publicly available guidelines, politically
minded prosecutors will doubtlessly err on the side of harshness and
may grow quite reluctant to show lenience on a case-by-case basis
against the backdrop of clear norms of severity.69

66. See, e.g., Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A
Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 260-64 (2005)

(describing the growing acceptance of restorative justice among criminal justice professionals
and specific examples of programs involving prosecution offices).
67. O'Hara, supra note 11, at 242-43, 245; Plea Bargainingfrom a Criminal Lawyer's
Perspective: Plea Bargaining in Wisconsin, supra note 26, at 377 (remarks of federal
prosecutor comparing her relationship with victim to defense lawyer's relationship with

client).
68. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3 (2003) (noting quintupling of U.S.
prison population between 1970s and 2000, giving U.S. highest per capita incarceration rate in
the world).
69. Professor Wright has raised such a concern over the adoption of prosecutorial

2007]

PLEA BARGAINING AND VICTIMS

The risk is admittedly a real one, but there are many caveats and
contingencies in this story. For instance, the historical relationship
between sentencing guidelines and sentencing severity may be more
coincidental than causal. There are certainly many other potential
explanations for American harshness than simply the adoption of
sentencing guidelines.7 1
Moreover, while the guidelines-severity
association may be manifest at the federal level, the association is less
clear elsewhere, with some states actually achieving reductions in prison
admissions after adopting guidelines.'
(Indeed, even at the federal
level, the guidelines system may sometimes operate as a brake on
severity. 72 ) One salient lesson from the state experience has been that
guidelines may avoid or minimize the one-way ratchet problem when
drafters are specifically instructed to predict the effects of what they do
on prison populations (and hence prison budgets).7 3 A similar mandate
may be given for prosecutorial guidelines, providing prosecutors with
political cover when they choose not to maximize severity.
An additional limitation on severity comes from defendants. As
plea offers grow harsher, more and more defendants will choose to go to
trial. Given the resource demands of trials, prosecutors will, at some
point, be forced to choose between more lenient guidelines and a
significant reduction in the number of cases that they can take. Of
course, prosecutors who turn away too many cases risk political
repercussions that are just as severe as those who adopt lenient
guidelines.
More speculatively, it is possible that sentence severity is driven, in
part, by the common belief that prosecutors give away too much in plea

guidelines, but hopes that a better-informed public will not necessarily "endorse[] cruel and

pointless policies." Wright, supra note 14, at 1104-05.
70. See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 68, at 6 (identifying cultural factors behind American
harshness); Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 799800 (2004) (describing grassroots movement in 1970s and 1980s for tougher response to drug
abuse problems, contributing to adoption of harsh mandatory minimums for drug offenses at
the federal level).
71. See, e.g., Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis Changing the
Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 41, 45 (2002)
(discussing North Carolina experience).
72. See Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1471, 1495-96 (2000) (noting that
Congress adopted safety valve feature for mandatory minimum laws in response to concerns
that mandatory minimums were disrupting proportionate sentencing scheme contained in
guidelines).
73. Wilhelm & Turner, supra note 71, at 46.
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bargaining.74 Legislators may be trying to use a predictably tough
sentencing system to offset an arbitrarily lenient plea bargaining system.
If public confidence in the plea bargaining system were enhanced, as
through transparent guidelines, then perhaps some pressure would be
taken off the sentencing system.
V. CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by much recent victims' rights legislation, it is
becoming increasingly well-accepted, at least at the level of abstract
principle, that victims should be given an opportunity to participate in
plea bargaining.75 It is less clear whether this commitment really is more
substantive than symbolic 76-- that is, whether victims and the public will
insist on, and prosecutors accept, real changes in existing practices. If
we are serious about victim participation, then it is time to move beyond
mushy consultation requirements and think more rigorously about due
process. Prosecutorial guidelines can play an important role in bringing
greater procedural justice to plea bargaining. Moreover, they promise
broader public benefits than just increased levels of victim satisfaction,
including enhanced feelings of respect for the law and legal authorities
among victims and defendants alike, better-informed and more
consistent plea bargaining outcomes,
and improved public
accountability.
Guidelines may also give rise to a variety of costs, and that the
benefits will outweigh the costs cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the
overall success of prosecutorial guidelines will likely depend on many
subtle, and perhaps currently unforeseeable, factors. Interestingly, this
was also the situation facing sentencing guidelines thirty years ago: great
potential seen at the level of theory was matched with great uncertainty
at the level of practice. Reformers proceeded notwithstanding the
uncertainties. The result was an uneven string of successes and failures.
Although some mistakes and rough spots are unavoidable, the
prosecutori
guidelines project may perhaps benefit from lessons
learned the hard way by the sentencing reform movement. With due
regard for the virtues of simplicity, flexibility, and obtaining buy-in from
74. See Herzog, supra note 24, at 591 (discussing this criticism of plea bargaining).
75. See OVC, supra note 7, at 1-2 (summarizing state laws dealing with role of victim in
plea bargaining).
76. See Michael M. O'Hear, Punishment,Democracy, and Victims, 19 FED. SENT'G REP.

1, 1-4 (2006) (noting both symbolic appeal of victims' rights legislation and uncertainty over
whether victims' rights movement will effect "real reform of the criminal justice system at an
operational level").
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front-line users, there is good reason to hope that prosecutorial
guidelines may consistently live up to expectations more than sentencing
guidelines.

*
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